Journal Articles

Pre-election polling and sequential elections

---

I consider a model in which the winner of a primary election faces a third candidate in a general election immediately thereafter. Prior to the primary election, there is a pre-election poll on how voters would vote in a hypothetical general election between one of the candidates in the primary election and the third candidate. I illustrate that voters have an incentive to misrepresent their voting intentions in the pre-election poll in order to influence voter beliefs about candidate electability in the general election and possibly cause voters to vote differently in the primary election.

---

Availability

No copy data

Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Call Number

-

Publisher

Thousand Oak : sage publisher., 2011

Collation

-

Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

09516298

Classification

-

Content Type

-

Media Type

-

Carrier Type

-

Edition

Vol. 23 no. 4, October 2011,pp. 463-479

Subject(s)

Strategic voting
Pre-election polling and sequential elections
Polling
Sequential elections

Specific Detail Info

-

Statement of Responsibility

-

Other version/related

File Attachment

Comments

---

You must be logged in to post a comment