Journal Articles

Domestic reform as a rationale for gradualism in international cooperation

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Gradualism is common in international cooperation, as states begin with limited cooperation and choose more ambitious targets slowly over time. However, most models of international cooperation are static and thus cannot explain gradualism. I show that when states can implement domestic reforms to reduce the cost of international cooperation, enforcement concerns prompt gradualism. First, to achieve ambitious international cooperation, states must internationally enforce costly domestic reform. Second, defection at the reform stage is particularly pernicious. When other states reform, their ability to punish the defector by suspending cooperation is reduced. States choose the extent of reform to maximize the benefits of expected international cooperation in the future. As collective enforcement power increases or the number of states decreases, the extent and pace of reform increase. Gradualism is also most probable in international public good provision because excludable benefits mitigate enforcement problems.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oak : sage publisher., 2011

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

09516298

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 23 no. 3, July 2011.pp. 400-427

Subject(s)

International cooperation
Gradualism
Game theory
Enforcement
Domestic reform as a rationale for gradualism

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