Journal Articles

Explaining Central Intervention in Local Extra-Budgetary Practices in China

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Abstract
Chinese local governments widely resort to extra-budgetary exaction to finance themselves, which generates side effects that necessitate central intervention. Through statistical analysis, this paper finds that the central government intervenes only selectively, following a logic driven by economic development and political stability.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Asian Survey

Call Number

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Publisher

California : the University of California Press., 2011

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

00044687

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 51, No. 3, May/June 2011, pp. 497-519

Subject(s)

China
Data analysis
Explaining Central Intervention
Central-local relations
Extra-budgetary finance
Principal-agent problem

Specific Detail Info

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