Journal Articles

Patrimony and Collective Capacity : An Analytical Outline

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This article investigates the ways in which the appropriation of offices and positions for personal use (“patrimony”) shapes incentive structures and collective capacity. Within the context of an agency relation, patrimonial power characterizes a mode of political dominance and resource management excluding accountability. This micro-analytical definition identifies three sources of variation: (1) the degree of codification, (2) the extent to which allegiance is personal (versus office-based), and (3) the extent to which dependence is asymmetrical. Patrimonial power enhances collective capacity through the creation of nodes of agency. It undermines this capacity by begetting arbitrary power and instability, by undercutting incentives for productive innovations, and by fostering the downward fragmentation of spheres of influence. Actors get out of this structural logic through two conjoint processes: (1) groups vying for office regulate the terms of their competition (intergroup dynamics), and (2) principals develop an incentive to make themselves accountable to fend off their agents’ possible exit (intragroup dynamics).

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Detail Information

Series Title

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oak : sage publisher., 2011

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

00027162

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 636 no. 1, July 2011.pp. 182-203

Subject(s)

Congress
Accountability
Patronage
Patrimony and Collective Capacity
Military commissions

Specific Detail Info

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