Journal Articles

Coalition agreement and party mandate : How coalition agreements constrain the ministers

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In coalition government, the relationship between parties and ministers is one of double delegation: from the party to the minister and from the coalition of parties to the individual minister. On the basis of principal—agent theory, I argue that a coalition agreement is a tool used by coalition parties to reduce agency loss when delegating to ministers. In six governments in Belgium, Italy and The Netherlands, I show that: a majority of the pledges were transferred into cabinet decisions, a majority of cabinet decisions were effectively constrained by the coalition agreement and that one-third of cabinet decisions had been precisely defined beforehand in the document. Interestingly, the length of the coalition agreement, the entry of party leaders to government and the number of ministers participating in the negotiations do not seem to have had a significant influence on the above two measurements.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Party Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oak : sage publisher., 2011

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

13540688

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 17 no. 3, May 2011 .pp. 385-404

Subject(s)

Party government
Coalition agreement and party mandate
Coalition government
Principal-agent theory

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