GUILT, ANGER, AND RETRIBUTION | Kemitraan Library

Search by :

ALL Author Subject ISBN/ISSN Advanced Search

Last search:

Journal Articles

GUILT, ANGER, AND RETRIBUTION

Rodogno, Raffaele - Personal Name;

This article focuses primarily on the emotion of guilt as providing a justification for retributive legal punishment. In particular, I challenge the claim according to which guilt can function as part of our epistemic justification of positive retributivism, that is, the view that wrongdoing is both necessary and sufficient to justify punishment. I show that the argument to this conclusion rests on two premises: (1) to feel guilty typically involves the judgment that one deserves punishment; and (2) those who feel guilty after wrongdoing are more virtuous (or less vicious) than those who do not. I shall argue that premise (1) is false on both empirical and conceptual grounds and that there are no particularly good grounds supporting this premise (2). Finally, I consider and reject the claim that anger, as opposed to guilt, can afford the type of epistemic justification needed by positive retributivism.

Availability

No copy data

Detail Information

Series Title: Legal Theory
Call Number: -
Publisher: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press., 2010
Collation: -
Language: English
ISBN/ISSN: 13523252
Classification: -
Content Type: -
Media Type: -
Carrier Type: -
Edition: Vol. 16, No. 1, March 2010. pp. 59-76
Subject(s): GUILT, ANGER, AND RETRIBUTION
Specific Detail Info: -
Statement of Responsibility: -

Other version/related

No other version available

File Attachment

No Data

Comments

You must be logged in to post a comment