Journal Articles

Electoral Competition When Some Candidates Lie and Others Pander

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In this paper we analyze a two-candidate electoral competition in which a candidate can either lie about his private policy preference in order to get elected, or pander to post-election external influences in choosing a policy to implement. Both the pre-election announcement and post-election implementation are a candidate’s strategic choices. We show that, in equilibrium, different types of candidates can cluster at different points around the median voter position, as long as the pandering type and the lying type coexist in the candidate pool. The pooling of all types of candidates at the median voter position is also an equilibrium. Thus, despite pressure towards the median (as all candidates want to win the election), both convergence and divergence in candidate announcements are normal outcomes of electoral competition.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

: sage publisher., 2010

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

09516298

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 22 no. 3 July 2010.pp. 333-358

Subject(s)

signaling
Electoral Competition
Pandering
Divergence
Electoral Competition When Some Candidates Lie

Specific Detail Info

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