Journal Articles

Ambiguous Statutes and Judicial Deference To Federal Agencies

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The Supreme Court’s Chevron decision raises questions about why Congress passes ambiguous statutes and why courts defer to agencies rather than impose their own interpretations. This article presents a model of policymaking where the legislature chooses strategically between an ambiguous and explicit statute, and where rulemaking and judicial review follow. The analysis reveals that when statutes are ambiguous, judges gain few policy advantages by deciding strategically on the basis of their policy preferences as opposed to simply following Chevron precedent. The results shows that legislative policy entrepreneurs can frequently advance their policy interests more successfully with ambiguous than with explicit language.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

: sage publisher., 2010

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

09516298

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 22, No. 2, April 2010. pp 217-245

Subject(s)

Congress
courts
American Politics
Agencies
Ambiguous Statutes and Judicial Deference

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