Journal Articles

Political Accountability Under Alternative Institutional Regimes

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We analyze the interaction between electoral accountability and separation-of-powers by comparing three regimes: ‘Unilateral Authority’ (the President has exclusive decision-making power); ‘Mandatory Checks’ (the President cannot change policy without congressional assent); and ‘Opt-in Checks’ (the President may seek congressional authorization or act unilaterally). We find: (1) voters use asymmetric electoral rewards and punishments to offset the risk of politician bias, but voters rely less on this blunt instrument if there are internal checks; (2) adding a veto player need not alter the ex ante likelihood of policy change; and (3) voter welfare is highest under Opt-In Checks and lowest under Unilateral Authority.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

: sage publisher., 2010

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

09516298

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 22, No. 2, April 2010. pp 139-167

Subject(s)

Electoral accountability
separation of powers
Formal theory
Political Accountability Under Alternative

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