Journal Articles

Institutional Constraints on Profligate Politicians: The Conditional Effect of Partisan Fragmentation on Budget Deficits

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The literature on the common pool resource problem in budgeting has thus far not explored the likely interaction between size fragmentation (the number of decision makers) and procedural fragmentation (the structure of the process in which they interact).The argument put forward in this article is that the effects of these two types of fragmentation should not be additive, but multiplicative, because theory suggests that the impact of size fragmentation on fiscal policy is conditional on the extent of procedural fragmentation. Using panel data for 57 countries over the period of 1975 to 1998, the author empirically investigates this interaction in the legislative context and finds strong evidence that partisan fragmentation is associated with higher deficits only when it is not moderated by limits on parliamentary amendment authority.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Comparative Political Studies

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oaks : sage publisher., 2010

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

00104140

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Edition

Vol. 43, No. 2, Feb 2010. pp. 208-229

Subject(s)

Fiscal policy
Political Party
Deficit
Budget institution
Legislature
Institutional Constraints on Profligate Politician

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