Journal Articles

Delegation and Discretion in Anticipation of Coalitional Drift

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If legislators are sensitive to coalitional drift, they must perforce be forward looking. In this article, we propose that legislators anticipate change in government—and any associated coalitional drift. That is, legislators recognize that the government could move from unified to divided or divided to unified. As such, how legislators structure an agency’s discretion may be affected by the current partisan control of the Congress and the White House as well as their anticipated partisan control. Using U.S. trade legislation data from 1890 to 1990, we find strong empirical evidence that legislators alter agency discretion prior to changes in the political status quo.

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Detail Information

Series Title

American Politics Research

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publication., 2009

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

1532-673x

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 37, No. 6, November 2009.pp. 983-1002

Subject(s)

Bureaucracy
Divided Government
Legislative behavior
U.S. Congress
Coalitional drift
Political control of bureaucracy
Delegation and Discretion in Anticipation

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