Journal Articles

Creation of Social Order in Ethnic Conflict

---

This article develops a model of random matching with costly monitoring to demonstrate that the threat of ethnic conflict can function to create an in-group policing mechanism which helps enforce inter-ethnic social order. Instead of regarding ethnic conflict as a form of collective penalty on an unidentified wrongdoer and his ethnic brethren (Fearon and Laitin, 1996), we argue that ethnic conflict is triggered by a wrongdoing because avengers seek to take advantage of in-group networks for detecting and punishing the culprit. Our theory predicts that the success of inter-ethnic cooperation hinges on the quality of in-group policing. As a consequence, a group with lower-quality policing tends to have more frequent and longer disputes with other groups.

---

Availability

No copy data

Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Call Number

-

Publisher

Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publication., 2009

Collation

-

Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

09516298

Classification

-

Content Type

-

Media Type

-

Carrier Type

-

Edition

Vol. 21, No. 3, July 2009.pp. 365-394

Subject(s)

Ethnic conflict
Social order
Social matching game
In-group policing
Costly monitoring
Creation of Social Order in Ethnic Conflict

Specific Detail Info

-

Statement of Responsibility

-

Other version/related

File Attachment

Comments

---

You must be logged in to post a comment