Journal Articles

In the Shadow of Democracy Promotion: Strategic Manipulation, International Observers, and Election Boycotts

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International efforts to promote democracy can have unanticipated effects. International election observation is perceived to increase domestic confidence in the electoral process and reduce fraud. Conversely, election boycotts are perceived to be more likely as electoral fairness decreases. The authors document a puzzling relationship between monitored elections and opposition party boycotts: Observers are associated with an increased boycott probability. They argue that international benefits for democratic elections give electoral autocrats the incentive to invite international observers and manipulate elections to minimize international criticism. This increase in "strategic manipulation" has led to changed incentives for opposition political parties, which have the most to lose from a manipulated but internationally certified election. Consequently, international monitors increase boycott probability. The authors support this explanation with an original data set of elections, boycotts, and international observers (1990 to 2002).

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Detail Information

Series Title

Comparative Political Studies

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publication., 2009

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

00104140

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Volume 42, Number 3, March 2009. pp. 392-415

Subject(s)

Democratization
Elections
Second-image reversed
Democracy promotion
International observers
Boycotts

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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