Journal Articles

The Dynamics of Lawmaking in a Bicameral Legislature: The Case of Brazil

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This article analyzes legislative performance in a nascent presidential bicameral democracy, taking Brazil as a case. The author argues that the timing and outcomes of legislative production are functions of bicameral incongruence, types of bicameralism, sequence of examination, and legislative bargaining. These hypotheses are tested using a new legislative data set from Brazil that covers over 3,000 bills submitted to the National Congress since 1988. Event history analyses of these bills show that presidential bicameral (coalitional) majorities, presidential elections, initiation by the lower house, and bills proposing provisional changes raise the chances of a bill's approval. The results also indicate that the effects of many of these variables are time dependent. In contrast, bicameral incongruence, symmetric bicameralism, and legislative elections either raise the risks of a bill's rejection or delay the timing of its approval. Economic crises increase legislative activities in general in both approving and rejecting bills

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Detail Information

Series Title

Comparative Political Studies

Call Number

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Publisher

California : Sage Publications., 2008

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

00104140

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 41, No. 12, December 2008. Page 1583-1606

Subject(s)

Congress
Brazil
Bicameralism
Legislative Politics
Gridlock
The Dynamics of Lawmaking

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