Journal Articles

Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule

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o survive in office, dictators need to establish power-sharing arrangements with their ruling coalitions,
which are often not credible. If dictators cannot commit to not abusing their "loyal friends"—those who choose
to invest in the existing autocratic institutions rather than in forming subversive coalitions— they will be in
permanent danger of being overthrown, both by members of the ruling elite and by outside rivals. This article explores the role of autocratic political parties and elections (both one-party and multiparty) in mitigating the commitment problem, making power-sharing between the dictator and his ruling coalition possible.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Comparative Political Studies

Call Number

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Publisher

California : Sage Publications., 2008

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

00104140

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 41, No. 4/5, Page 715 - 741

Subject(s)

Political parties
Autocracy
Autocratic elections
power sharing
Comitment problems
Authoritarian longevity
Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity

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