Journal Articles

Beyond Clientelism: Incumbent State Capture and State Formation

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In choosing strategies of state capture (the extraction of private benefits by incumbent officeholders from the state), rulers choose whether to share rents with popular constituencies and whether to tolerate competition. These choices are conditioned by existing organizational endowments, the costs of buying support, and the trade-off between the cost and probability of exit from office. In turn, both rent distribution and competition result in distinct configurations of state capture: clientelism, predation, fusion, exploitation, and the formation of specific state institutions and capacities.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Comparative Political Studies

Call Number

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Publisher

California : Sage Publications., 2008

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0010-4140

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 41, No. 4/5, Page 638 - 673

Subject(s)

Competition
state capture strategies
Rent distribution
Beyond Clientelism

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