Journal Articles

A Spatial Model of Competitive Bidding for Government Grants: Why Efficiency Gains Are Limited

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With a view to improving public sector efficiency many governments now make public sector bodies competitively
bid for funding. We model the bidding process as a game of spatial competition. Using Monte Carlo simulations we show that in efficient equilibria many bidding groups will not be under competitive pressure.
The model suggests that this is because their ideal projects are inherently valuable for the funding agency and other groups cannot match this without departing so far from their ideal that they would rather not be successful. We test the hypothesis that competition will be limited largely to groups whose preferred projects are of medium quality on data from the UK Single Regeneration Budget. Using resubmitted bids to track the impact of competition, we find evidence consistent with this hypothesis.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoritical Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

California : Sage Publications., 2008

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

09516298

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 20, No. 1, January 2008. Page 47-66

Subject(s)

Competition
Bidding
Public sector
Grants

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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