Journal Articles

The Legislative Median and Partisan Policy

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We show that the median legislator in the US House is unambiguously closer to the majority party median than
to the minority party median. An important implication of this finding is that the median legislator is predisposed to
support the majority party's policy agenda. Thus, in the event that the majority party organization exerts no influence
over the legislative process, and in the event that all policies then default to the legislative median, policy outcomes will still substantially favor the majority party over the minority. We demonstrate that the legislative median moves predictably toward the majority party in response to changes in majority control and the size and ideological homogeneity of the two parties. Consequently, the median legislators' partisan predisposition increases and decreases in response to electoral change. We conclude that partisan and floor majority, or median, theories of lawmaking are more often complementary than conflicting, and that party activities in the electoral arena have implications for legislative partisanship.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoritical Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

California : Sage Publications India., 2008

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0951-6298

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 20, No. 1, January 2008. Page 5-29

Subject(s)

Elections
Parties
Congress
Median voter
The Legislative Median and Partisan Policy

Specific Detail Info

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