Journal Articles

Rational Expectations or Heuristics?: Strategic Voting in Proportional Representation Systems

---

The process of information of electoral expectations in proportional representation systems is analysed in this article. Contrary to Duvergerian or electoral coordination theories, by using survey and in-depth elite intervieew data from Spain in the 1970s and 1980s, it is show that strategic voting depends on heuritics rather than on rational expectations. The main implication is taht strategic voting is possible in large districs.

---

Availability

No copy data

Detail Information

Series Title

Party Politics

Call Number

-

Publisher

: Sage Publications., 2008

Collation

-

Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

1354-0688

Classification

-

Content Type

-

Media Type

-

Carrier Type

-

Edition

Vol. 14, No. 1, January 2008. Page 31-49

Subject(s)

Heuritics
Multi-member districts
Rational expectations
Spain
Strategic voting

Specific Detail Info

-

Statement of Responsibility

-

Other version/related

File Attachment

Comments

---

You must be logged in to post a comment