Journal Articles

Contingent technocracy: bureaucratic independence in developing countries

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This study investigates the effects of formal bureaucratic independence under varying democratic conditions. Conventional accounts predict that greater formal independence of technocratic agencies facilitates policy implementation, but those claims rest on observations of industrialised, high-income countries that are also established democracies. On the basis of research in developing countries, we argue that the effects of agency independence depend on the political context in which the agency operates. Our empirical subjects are privatisation agencies and their efforts to privatise state-owned enterprises in Africa. We predict that greater independence leads to more thorough privatisation under authoritarian regimes, but that the effect of independence declines as a country becomes more democratic. Using an original data set, we examine the relationship between formal agency independence and privatisation in Africa from 1990 to 2007. Our results modify the conventional wisdom on bureaucratic independence and culminate in a more nuanced theory of “contingent technocracy”.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Public POlicy

Call Number

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Publisher

New York : Cambridge University Press., 2017

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0141814X

Classification

NONE

Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Volume 37, Issue 4, December 2017, p. 401-429

Subject(s)

Democratization
Bureaucracy
Africa
Privatisation
Agency independence

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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