Journal Articles

No vacancy: holdover capacity and the continued staffing of major commissions

---

Although the United States (US) federal bureaucracy is plagued by high vacancy rates generally, quorum requirements and small board sizes make vacancies particularly problematic within major independent regulatory commissions. Not all vacancies, however, are created equal. By statute, some major boards allow members to continue serving beyond their original term in the absence of a confirmed replacement. The difference between an empty seat and a holdover official is important as it can determine whether a board is functional or inoperable. In this article, we examine how the presence of holdover provisions within such commissions alters confirmation dynamics and vacancy rates. Evidence suggests that holdover provisions lead to quicker confirmation on nominations as well as fewer complete vacancies. Such structures thus help mitigate the short-term problems stemming from staffing independent regulatory boards, especially given the tendency towards obstruction in the US Senate.

---

Availability

No copy data

Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Public Policy

Call Number

-

Publisher

New York : Cambridge University Press., 2017

Collation

-

Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0141814X

Classification

NONE

Content Type

-

Media Type

-

Carrier Type

-

Edition

Volume 37, Issue 4, December 2017, p. 341-361

Subject(s)

Public policy
executive nominations
major regulatory commissions
vacancy

Specific Detail Info

-

Statement of Responsibility

-

Other version/related

File Attachment

Comments

---

You must be logged in to post a comment