Journal Articles

The Secret Ballot and the Market for Votes at 19th-Century British Elections

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This article examines the impact of the secret ballot on the market for votes at parliamentary elections in the 19th-century United Kingdom. I use a formal model of an exchange between a candidate and a voter to predict the impact of the secret ballot on bribe prices, the marginal effect campaign spending on candidates’ electoral prospects, and election turnout. I test these predictions against original data on bribe prices and campaign expenditures at over 500 parliamentary elections. The results are consistent with the argument that the secret ballot induced British parliamentary candidates to divert their campaign spending away from vote-buying and toward turnout-buying. These results point to the adaptability of political actors in the face of institutional changes.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Comparative Political Studies

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications., 2017

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

00104140

Classification

NONE

Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Volume 50, Issue 5, April 2017; pp. 594–635

Subject(s)

Democratization
Regime Change
Campaign finance
Corruption and patronage

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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