 
                Journal Articles
Valence uncertainty and the nature of the candidate pool in elections
              Political parties in US politics are becoming increasingly polarized, with a growing number of 
extreme candidates entering electoral races. Why would extremists challenge more moderate 
opponents, since their chances of winning are supposedly very slim? I develop a model of 
electoral competition and endogenous entry to show that extremists rely on the possibility that 
the campaign might reveal information about the opponents’ quality that can induce some voters 
to change their electoral decision. The weight voters place on candidates’ valence determines the 
incidence of uncontested elections and the degree of asymmetry in polarization of the 
candidates’ policy positions in contested elections. Finally, I extend the model to consider 
asymmetric information about individual valence levels. I show that uncontested races are still possible in equilibrium, that in contested races at least one candidate has high valence, and the 
valence-advantaged candidate can be the one with the more extreme policy stance.
            
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