Journal Articles

Group incentives and rational voting

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Our model describes competition between groups driven by the choices of self-interested voters
within groups. Within a Poisson voting environment, parties observe aggregate support from
groups and can allocate prizes or punishments to them. In a tournament style analysis, the model
characterizes how contingent allocation of prizes based on relative levels of support affects
equilibrium voting behavior. In addition to standard notions of pivotality, voters influence the
distribution of prizes across groups. Such prize pivotality supports positive voter turnout even in
non-competitive electoral settings. The analysis shows that competition for a prize awarded to
the most supportive group is only stable when two groups actively support a party. However,
competition among groups to avoid punishment is stable in environments with any number of
groups. We conclude by examining implications for endogenous group formation and how
politicians structure the allocation of rewards and punishments.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications., 2017

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0951-6298

Classification

NONE

Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Volume 29, Issue 2, April 2017; pp. 299–326

Subject(s)

Voting
Turnout
pivotality
pivotal voting
random population model

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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