Journal Articles

Bargaining with a biased autocrat

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This paper presents a specific dynamic extension to the model outlined by Jackson and Morelli
(Political bias and war. The American Economic Review 97(4): 1353–1373). In particular, we
focus on the implications of a long-lived leader who possesses bias towards or against war that
potentially differs from the country (s)he represents. Bargaining and war outcomes are
characterized in this environment. We emphasize three results: (1) war sometimes occurs only
after substantial delay; (2) if it is possible to select a leader, a country will always select a leader
who is biased towards war; (3) when the distribution of power is uneven, a country might select
an aggressive leader who eventually leads the country into war. If applied in the context of a civil
war model, the third result implies that particularly disadvantaged rebel groups might select
aggressive leaders to bargain with the central government and, potentially, incite conflict.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications., 2017

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0951-6298

Classification

NONE

Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Volume 29, Issue 2, April 2017; pp. 273–298

Subject(s)

bargaining
Conflict
War
leaders

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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