Journal Articles

Are non-competitive elections good for citizens?

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Many regimes, particularly autocracies, hold elections where the ruling regime’s victory is a
foregone conclusion. This paper provides a formal analysis of how these non-competitive
elections affect citizen welfare compared to a non-electoral baseline. To do so, I first develop a
game-theoretic framework that captures many extant theories of why regimes hold non-
competitive elections, which are modeled solely as a public signal of the regime’s strength.
Incumbents hold non-competitive elections to signal strength or gather information, which
allows the regime to manage political interactions more effectively. However, even though non-
competitive elections are a useful tool for (autocratic) regimes, they are also valuable to citizens.
This is because citizens can also utilize the information generated by the election, and may
receive more transfers, less repression, or more responsive policy than they would with no
elections.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications., 2017

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0951-6298

Classification

NONE

Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Volume 29, Issue 2, April 2017; pp. 214–242

Subject(s)

Elections
authoritarian politics
welfare analysis

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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