Journal Articles

Ambition, personalist regimes, and control of authoritarian leaders

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Why do elites in some authoritarian regimes but not others remove from power the leaders who
harm their interests? We develop a formal theory explaining this. The theory shows how elites’
ambition prevents them from controlling authoritarian leaders. Because ambitious elites are
willing to stage coups to acquire power even when the leader is good, ambition renders elites’
claims that the leader’s actions harm them less credible, making the other elites less likely to
support coups. We show that the impact of the proportion of competent politicians on personalist
regimes is non-monotonic: personalist regimes are most likely to emerge not only when there are
few competent politicians but also when there are lots of them. We also provide insight into
which elites become coup-plotters. The theory explains the emergence of personalist regimes, the
frequency of coups, and why some authoritarian countries enjoy a more competent leadership
than others.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications., 2017

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0951-6298

Classification

NONE

Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Volume 29, Issue 2, April 2017; pp. 167–190

Subject(s)

Political control
Coups
authoritarian regimes

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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