Journal Articles

Now or later? A dynamic analysis of judicial appointments

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Observing substantial variations in Senate confirmation durations, existing studies have tried to explain when the Senate takes more or less time to confirm presidential nominees. However, they have largely ignored the president’s incentives to nominate someone who he expects will be
delayed and do not specify conditions under which delay occurs. To improve on existing
literature, I develop a dynamic model of presidential appointments in which the Senate decides
whether to delay as well as whether to confirm the nominee. The model shows that the president
rationally chooses a nominee who he expects the Senate will delay if the status quo belongs to a
certain interval in a one-dimensional policy space. Moreover, the president sometimes chooses a
nominee who may fail to gain confirmation after a delay. Finally, the effects of important factors
on expected confirmation duration are analyzed: most interestingly, as presidential popularity
increases, the Senate takes longer to confirm the nominee

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications., 2017

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0951-6298

Classification

NONE

Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Volume 29, Issue 1, January 2017; pp. 149–164

Subject(s)

interbranch bargaining
judicial appointments
confirmation duration

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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