Journal Articles

Policy dynamics and electoral uncertainty in the appointments process

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By incorporating electoral uncertainty and policy dynamics into three two-period models of the
appointments process, we show that gridlock may not always occur under divided government,
contrary to the findings of static one-shot appointments models. In these cases, contrary to the
ally principle familiar to students of bureaucratic politics, the president or the confirmer is
willing to move the court away from his or her ideal point as a way to insulate against worse
outcomes in period two. By demonstrating how a simple set of changes to a workhorse model
can change equilibrium outcomes significantly, this paper provides a foundation for
reconsidering the static approach to studying political appointments.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications., 2017

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0951-6298

Classification

NONE

Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Volume 29, Issue 1, January 2017; pp. 124–148

Subject(s)

courts
Divided Government
Gridlock
appointments
interbranch bargaining

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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