Journal Articles

Ideology signaling in electoral politics

---

This paper considers an electoral model in which an incumbent and a challenger have ideological
policy preferences that are private information. The incumbent may bias pre-electoral policies to
signal preferences to the electorate with the aim of affecting the outcome of the election. When
the two candidates are of completely different types, such a policy bias can occur only in a
moderate direction. However, when their possible types overlap, a policy bias can be created in
either a moderate or an extreme direction.

---

Availability

No copy data

Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Call Number

-

Publisher

Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications., 2017

Collation

-

Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0951-6298

Classification

NONE

Content Type

-

Media Type

-

Carrier Type

-

Edition

Volume 29, Issue 1, January 2017; pp. 48–68

Subject(s)

Elections
Ideology
signaling
private information

Specific Detail Info

-

Statement of Responsibility

-

Other version/related

File Attachment

Comments

---

You must be logged in to post a comment