Journal Articles

How uncertainty about judicial nominees can distort the confirmation process

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Why are judicial nominees allowed to refuse to answer questions about important issues that
could come before the courts? We address this question by examining the information
environment surrounding judicial nominations. Using the Supreme Court as our example, we formulate a model that departs from the existing literature by incorporating the fact that the
Senate often does not know what type of candidate the President is trying to appoint. Our model
shows when the President and Senate are ideologically divergent, low information about
nominees’ views results in the Senate occasionally rejecting acceptable nominees. However,
when the President and Senate are ideologically close, the President benefits from leaving the
process opaque—that is, allowing his nominees to avoid answering tough questions. Thus, even
though low information can be costly to both parties, keeping the process nontransparent shields
the President from being penalized for selecting more like-minded (and possibly extreme)
judges.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications., 2017

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0951-6298

Classification

NONE

Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Volume 29, Issue 1, January 2017; pp. 22–47

Subject(s)

Supreme court
judicial politics
confirmation hearings
appointments

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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