Journal Articles

May’s theorem in one dimension

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This paper provides three versions of May’s theorem on majority rule, adapted to the one-
dimensional model common in formal political modeling applications. The key contribution is
that single peakedness of voter preferences allows us to drop May’s restrictive positive
responsiveness axiom. The simplest statement of the result holds when voter preferences are
single peaked and linear (no indifferences), in which case a voting rule satisfies anonymity,
neutrality, Pareto, and transitivity of weak social preference if and only if the number of
individuals is odd and the rule is majority rule.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications., 2017

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0951-6298

Classification

NONE

Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Volume 29, Issue 1, January 2017; pp. 3–21

Subject(s)

Majority rule
single peaked
transitivity
May's theorem

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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