Journal Articles

Economic accountability and strategic calibration The case of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party

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I argue that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan employed a strategy to prevent unpopular prime ministers from tainting the party’s image. Time-series analyses of public opinion data from 1960 to 2006 show that national economic performance had modest effects on prime minister support ratings and no effects on LDP ratings. When prime minister ratings fall below party ratings, cabinets are more likely to be reshuffled and prime ministers to be replaced to avoid having the cabinet’s negative image ‘rub off’ on the LDP. Although electoral rules, culture, and other factors surely play a role in sustaining the LDP, I show for the first time that the party manages its cabinet personnel strategically to maintain support.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Party Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oaks : Sage Publications., 2015

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

1354-0688

Classification

NONE

Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Volume 21, Number 3 May 2015, pages 346-356

Subject(s)

Japan
Selecting leaders
LiberaDemocratic Party of Japan (LDP)
Office goals

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