Journal Articles

The Non-Democratic Origins of Income Taxation

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This article examines the adoption of income taxes in Western economies since the 19th century. We identify two empirical regularities that challenge predictions of existing models of taxation and redistribution: While countries with low levels of electoral enfranchisement and high levels of landholding inequality adopt the income tax first, countries with more extensive electoral rules lag behind in adopting these new forms of taxation. We propose an explanation of income tax adoption that accounts for these empirical regularities. We discuss the most important economic consideration of politicians linked to owners of different factors, namely, the shift of the tax burden between sectors, and examine how preexisting electoral rules affect these political calculations. The article provides both a cross-national test of this argument and a microhistorical test that examines the economic and political determinants of support for the adoption of the income tax in 1842 in Britain.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Comparative Political Studies

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oaks : Sage Publications., 2015

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0010-4140

Classification

NONE

Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Volume 48, Issue 14 December 2015, P. 1974-2009

Subject(s)

Political economy
Politics of growth/development
Nondemocratic regime
Fiscal capacity

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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