Journal Articles

Political Parties, Clientelism, and Bureaucratic Reform

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The challenge of public administration reform is well known: Politicians often have little interest in the efficient implementation of government policy. Using new data from 439 World Bank public sector reform loans in 109 countries, we demonstrate that such reforms are significantly less likely to succeed in the presence of non-programmatic political parties. Earlier research uses evidence from a small group of countries to conclude that clientelist politicians resist reforms that restrict their patronage powers. We support this conclusion with new evidence from many countries, allowing us to rule out alternative explanations, including the effect of electoral and political institutions. We also examine reforms that have not been the subject of prior research: those that make public sector financial management more transparent. Here, we identify a second mechanism through which non-programmatic parties undermine public sector reform: Clientelist politicians have weaker incentives to exercise oversight of policy implementation by the executive branch.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Comparative Political Studies

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oaks : Sage Publications., 2015

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0010-4140

Classification

NONE

Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Volume 48, Issue 14 December 2015, P. 1942-1973

Subject(s)

Political parties
Political economy
Public administration
Clientelism

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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