Journal Articles

Credibility Versus Control Agency Independence and Partisan Influence in the Regulatory State

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There is a natural tension between theories of party government and theories of regulatory politics. Whereas effective party government requires that politicians have firm control over public policy, the need for credible commitment in regulation stipulates that policy-making capacities are delegated to independent agencies. While the theoretical dimension of this tension is well established, there is little research that examines its empirical implications. To narrow this gap, the analysis assesses whether legal agency independence limits the influence of parties on agency executives. To that end, it investigates the careers of 300 CEOs in 100 West European regulatory agencies. The analysis shows that high levels of agency independence protect appointees with opposition ties from early removal. This presents some of the first evidence to suggest that the institutional response to credibility pressures limits the political use of the appointment channel and, thus, has the potential to constrain party control in regulatory politics.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Comparative Political Studies

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oaks : Sage Publications., 2015

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0010-4140

Classification

NONE

Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Volume 48, Issue 7 June 2015, pages 823-853

Subject(s)

Political parties
Credibility
Patronage
Agency independence

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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