Journal Articles

Policy Divergence in Implementation: How Conflict among Decisive Legislators Reinforces the Effect of Agency Preferences

---

The question whether political conflict affects the course and outcomes of policy implementation is debated among scholars in public administration. Whereas some scholars emphasize the mediating effects of procedures for political control of bureaucracy, other scholars highlight the actions and preferences of agencies. The present study combines both perspectives and argues that policy divergence is explained by political conflict in interaction with agency preferences. Political conflict is specified in conjunction with the decision-making context. Conflict among decisive legislators—rather than the legislature as a whole—is hypothesized to reinforce the effect of agency preferences on policy divergence. Using a cross-classified multilevel design, data on local policy making and implementation in the Netherlands offer support for these hypotheses and reveal that preferences of agencies and conflict among decisive legislators should be included in explanations for policy divergences in the implementation process.

---

Availability

No copy data

Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory

Call Number

-

Publisher

Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press., 2012

Collation

p. 195-217

Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

1053-1858

Classification

-

Content Type

-

Media Type

-

Carrier Type

-

Edition

Volume 22 Issue 2 April 2012 p. 195-217

Subject(s)

Bureaucracy
Research
Political Conflict

Specific Detail Info

-

Statement of Responsibility

-

Other version/related

File Attachment

Comments

---

You must be logged in to post a comment