Journal Articles

Agency Performance and Executive Pay in Government: An Empirical Test

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Public management reform has drawn inspiration from principal agent theory and private management, and a favored reform strategy has been civil service reform that strongly recommends pay-for-performance. The hypothesis tested in this paper is that the incentive effect will improve public sector management. The basis is the performance management system introduced in Danish central government where access to both performance and pay data provides us with unique behavioral data. The system combines performance contracts with executive contracts for agency heads, who in this way can earn a bonus based on agency performance. We find no support for the hypothesis and discuss the result against principal agent theory, private sector experience, and bureaucratic theory.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory

Call Number

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Publisher

Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press., 2012

Collation

p. 31-54

Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

1053-1858

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Volume 22 Issue 1 January 2012 p. 31-54

Subject(s)

Bureaucracy
public management
Institutional

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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