Journal Articles

Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure: Spending, Repression, and Sanctions

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This article explores how international sanctions affect authoritarian rulers’ decisions concerning repression and public spending composition. Rulers whose budgets are not severely constrained by sanctions will tend to increase spending in those categories that most benefit their core support groups. When budget constraints are severe, dictators are more likely to increase repression. Using data on regime types, public expenditures and spending composition (1970–2000) as well as on repression levels (1976–2001), I show that the empirical patterns conform well to the theoretical expectations. Single-party regimes, when targeted by sanctions, increase spending on subsidies and transfers which largely benefit their key constituencies. Likewise, military regimes increase their expenditures on goods and services, which include military equipment and soldiers’ and officers’ wages. Conversely, personalist regimes targeted by sanctions reduce spending in all categories and thus increase repression more than other autocracies.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Comparative Political Studies

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications., 2012

Collation

p. 683-713

Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0010-4140

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Volume 45 Number 6 June 2012 p. 683-713

Subject(s)

Economic Sanctions
authoritarian regimes
revenues
public expenditures

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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