Journal Articles

Factions with clout: Presidential cabinet coalition and policy in the Uruguayan parliament

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We investigate bill passage by party factions in Uruguay and show that those joining cabinet coalitions earn policy influence. The policy advantage of coalition is therefore not collected by the president alone, as often implied: partners acquire clout in law-making and use it to pass bills of their own and to strike deals with outside factions. Analysis of all bills initiated between 1985 and 2005 reveals that the odds of passing a bill sponsored alone by a majority cabinet faction was about 0.5, up from about 0.15 otherwise. Contingent upon the cabinet status of factions involved, the odds of co-sponsored bills conform well to patterns expected by a view that policy rewards are a fundamental part of the politics of coalition in presidentialism.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Party Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publications., 2012

Collation

p. 427-451

Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

1354-0688

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Volume 18, Number 3, May 2012 p. 427-451

Subject(s)

Intra-party democracy
Policy Goals
Party Factionalism
presidential cabinet government

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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