Journal Articles

Constructing Accountability : Party Position Taking and Economic Voting

---

A positive relationship between economic performance and support for incumbents is routinely taken as evidence that elections work for accountability. Recent investigations into this relationship have examined just how signals from the economy translate into popular support. However, neither selection models nor sanctioning models explicitly incorporate the actions of political elites. This article advances a strategic parties model of economic voting. Political incumbents have incentives to adjust their policy positions in response to economic conditions. When parties advocate distinct positions on economic issues, elections can be understood in terms of economic conditions. But when party positions converge, the quality of economic information declines. Incumbents can thus improve their chances of avoiding blame for a poor economy—or of claiming credit for a good one—by adjusting positions in policy space. Analyses of party positions, economic conditions, and election outcomes in 17 democracies over 35 years support this prediction.

---

Availability

No copy data

Detail Information

Series Title

Comparative Political Studies

Call Number

-

Publisher

Thousand Oak : sage publisher., 2012

Collation

-

Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

00104140

Classification

-

Content Type

-

Media Type

-

Carrier Type

-

Edition

Vol. 45 no. 1, January 2012,pp. 91-118

Subject(s)

Economic voting
Party competition
Constructing Accountability
Party strategies
Partisan model
Selection model

Specific Detail Info

-

Statement of Responsibility

-

Other version/related

File Attachment

Comments

---

You must be logged in to post a comment