Journal Articles

Out of the Cabinet : What Drives Defections From the Government in Presidential Systems?

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This article challenges a key part of the conventional view of coalitions in presidential systems that sees them as short-lived and ad hoc. The author shows instead that there is wide variation in the durability of governing coalitions across these regimes. She develops a theory of the incentives of parties to participate in the government and the circumstances under which scholars might expect to see the existing governing coalition break down. The author draws on data from 121 cabinets in 12 Latin American countries between the late 1980s and the mid-2000s to show that the dissolution of the cabinet is more likely when the president places less value on coalition building as a policy-making strategy and when parties find it costly to participate in the government. In particular, the author shows that strong unilateral institutional powers tend to diminish the incentives of presidents to compromise with other parties; in contrast, effective legislatures and high rates of approval for the executive contribute significantly to more stable governments.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Comparative Political Studies

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oak : sage publisher., 2012

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

00104140

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 45 no. 1, January 2012,pp. 62-90

Subject(s)

Latin America
Out of the Cabinet
Cabinet stability
Presidential system
Decree powers

Specific Detail Info

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