I examine how different distributions of ownership and governance rights in firms affect the optimal organization of cross-functional project teams for knowledge-intensive work. I analyze multi-method data from two competing automated manufacturing equipment engineering firms with contrasting formal power structures, one a worker cooperative with ownership and governance rights distributed acro…
Federal agencies and universities in the U.S. promote interdisciplinary research because it presumably spurs transformative, innovative science. Using data on almost 900 research-center–based scientists and their 32,000 published articles, along with a set of unpublished papers, we assess whether such research is indeed beneficial and whether costs accompany the potential benefits. Existing res…
Economic transitions in countries that move from state planning and redistribution to market exchange create business opportunities but also uncertainty, because many interdependent factors—modes of exchange, types of products, and forms of organizations—are in flux. Uncertainty is even greater when the country’s political institutions remain authoritarian because the rule of law is weak and st…
How CEOs think and feel about time may have a big influence on their firms’ strategies. We examine how two distinct CEO temporal dispositions—time urgency (the feeling of being chronically hurried) and pacing style (one’s pattern of effort over time in working toward deadlines)—each influence corporate entrepreneurship, a key strategic behavior. We propose that CEOs’ temporal leadership—how the…
We examine how directors’ political ideologies, specifically the board-level average of how conservative or liberal directors are, influence boards’ decisions about CEO compensation. Integrating research on corporate governance and political psychology, we theorize that conservative and liberal boards will differ in their prevailing beliefs about the appropriate amounts CEOs should be paid and,…
This article examines the impact of the secret ballot on the market for votes at parliamentary elections in the 19th-century United Kingdom. I use a formal model of an exchange between a candidate and a voter to predict the impact of the secret ballot on bribe prices, the marginal effect campaign spending on candidates’ electoral prospects, and election turnout. I test these predictions against…