Federalist No. 1 sets the basic framework for interpreting the U.S. Constitution. It contains an implied definition of “good government” that occupied the founders as they built a stronger national government. This essay explains the conflict embedded in the debate between the two theories of good government offered by Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson and asks how the competing definitio…
Federalist Nos. 6 and 7 address the problems of disunion that led the founders to imagine a stronger national government, arguing that the states were and would continue to be a source of unyielding conflict without national supremacy. This essay asks how the states have adjusted to the Constitution under the Tenth Amendment and posits that the states are a hidden source of energy toward good g…
Federalist No. 10 arguably is the most frequently read of the Federalist Papers, in no small measure because it offers a distinct and often negative image of the polity as a source of conflict. It argues that factions cannot be tamed, but they can be controlled. This essay argues that factions have weakened effective public administration and offers a detailed discussion of the proliferation of…
Federalist No. 10 contains an optimistic view of the national government's ability to fulfill its obligations in the midst of what was, at the time, a small but challenged nation. This essay suggests that the founders did not anticipate the pernicious effects of rent seeking, corruption, and repression of minorities, and they failed to anticipate the calamities associated with slavery. The essa…
Federalist No. 23 offers a strong case for national power and the need to grant “means proportional to the end” to the new government. This essay argues that the founders could not have anticipated the breadth of today's national agenda and offers a framework for designing a more strategic and effective public enterprise.
One of the great themes of The Federalist Papers is that good government is dependent on good administration. In Federalist No. 27, Publius underscores two important themes. First, he argues that in order to preserve citizen confidence in government, there must be competent administration, and second, he maintains the need for a strong national government to safeguard the republican principles …
Federalist Nos. 12 and 30–36 describe the benefits of a national fiscal system with independent revenues, arguing that a strong national government cannot exist for long without the means to raise revenues on its own. This essay examines the national fiscal policy process during this period of economic crisis and rising national debt. It provides a detailed assessment of needed reforms in the b…
Federalist Nos. 41–43 provide a unified justification for the powers granted to the national government by posing a series of questions about the four classes of responsibilities, such as declaring war. This essay examines the role of polarization in limiting the coordination of powers needed for effective administration and uses ideology estimates for four states to illustrate the difficulties…
Federalist No. 44 examines the connective mechanisms underlying a federal system of government. Traditionally called “intergovernmental relations,” these systems were intended to facilitate the pursuit of effective implementation of national policies. This essay suggests that the national government's officers should not be impressed by collaboration unless it produces better performance or low…
Federalist No. 51 is another of the most recognizable and important of the Federalist Papers, famously arguing that one first must enable government to control the governed, and then oblige it to control itself. The authors suggest that part of this obligation involves effective collaboration within a system of separate powers. They then ask how this “collaboration imperative” can be exercised …
Federalist No. 51 can be read as a statement of the national government’s dual responsibility to serve the public interest and to preserve liberty. It is built on James Madison’s belief in checks and balances as a method for keeping government’s parts in their proper places. This essay asks whether this gridlock has gone too far in rendering the constitutional design obsolete. Drawing on previo…
Federalist No. 67 generally is read as a vigorous defense of the chief executive and contains intense language to alleviate fears of a dictatorial president. However, it also can be read as a much deeper explication of the blend of republican and energetic government. The author examines this defense within the larger stream of Federalist Papers and compares the Anti-Federalist attacks against …
Federalist Nos. 67–77 offer a strong defense of the “energetic executive” embedded in the new constitution, which is perhaps best captured in Alexander Hamilton’s famous conclusion that “the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration.” This essay places this basic definition into historical context by reviewing the erosion of the national govern…
Federalist No. 70 is widely viewed as a sweeping description and defense of the need for energy in the executive. This essay begins this detailed examination of Federalist No. 70 by comparing Alexander Hamilton’s ideals with James Madison’s more cautionary exposition on separated powers. According to the author, Hamilton’s notion of a public service driven by honor eventually was undermined by …
Federalist No. 70 sets the stage for a powerful chief executive through its emphasis on energy in the executive. This essay reviews the challenges of holding this energy accountable in a republican form of government and concludes that recent presidents have stretched their authorities beyond even the most aggressive defense of the concept. Comparing presidents Abraham Lincoln and George W. Bus…
Federalist No. 70 argues that presidents will rise above factions through their power to assemble a government composed of highly motivated, accountable officers. The author confronts this assumption through a detailed examination of the heavy use of contractors in today’s administrative state. She documents the challenges and dangers associated with the role of contractors to execute the laws …
Federalist No. 71 and Federalist No. 76 focus on the level of authority in the executive. This essay reviews the recent history of efforts to measure government performance as a way to control executive performance and then proceeds to a discussion of the weakness inherent in past approaches. The author uses the Government Performance and Results Act and the George W. Bush administration’s Prog…
Federalist No. 71 contains a strong defense of duration in office as a source of “cool and sedate reflection” by the executive. According to Alexander Hamilton’s argument, duration in office is essential for the vigilant autonomy needed to faithfully execute the laws. The author examines this argument within the context of government regulation, using the recent financial crisis and consumer sa…
Federalist No. 72 is an oft-neglected defense of the president’s reeligibility for election. However, the paper goes well beyond this issue to basic models of human nature and motivation. James L. Perry’s essay confronts this broad issue as a guide to “a public service ethic.” Like other authors in this special issue, Perry reads broadly through the Federalist Papers in search of a deeper defin…
Federalist No. 76 describes the process for appointing the top officers of government, which was seen as essential for recruiting the aptitude and tendency toward good administration. This essay examines the process as it has evolved into a series of Herculean tests of political endurance. Having illuminated the founders’ basic intent for expeditious and honorable appointments, the analysis pro…