Journal Articles

Politics, Careerism, and the Voluntary Departures of U.S. District Court Judges

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Prior studies hypothesize that judges time their retirements to allow a like-minded president to select their replacements. We propose a modification to this argument and theorize that during the earlier part of a district court judge’s career, it is the likelihood of elevation to an appeals court and other career-oriented concerns that affect whether the judge resigns or stays on the bench. It is during the latter stage of a judge’s career when the desire to be replaced with a like-minded judge affects the retirement decision. Our analysis reveals that judges who are not yet pension eligible are influenced by being passed over for appeals court nominations as well as financial incentives to leave for private practice. Only judges who have attained pension eligibility appear to consider their ideological compatibility with the president when deciding to call it quits.

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Detail Information

Series Title

American Politics Research

Call Number

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Publisher

: sage publisher., 2010

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

1532673x

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 38 no. 6, November 2010.pp. 986-1014

Subject(s)

Judicial Behavior
Judicial careers
Federal judges
U.S. Distric Courts

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

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