Journal Articles

Incentives for Dentists in Public Service: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

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How can independent physician contractors be motivated to contribute to public service health care? We consider evidence, derived from a natural experiment in the UK publicly funded dental care system, concerning the efficacy of using a contractual mechanism that provides explicit rewards for increased service provision against the alternative of offering an employment-like relationship. We find that dentists who were moved from quasi-employment to an activity-based incentive contract increased their activity in the publicly funded service by 26%. We also find and quantify evidence of considerable variation between suppliers, which suggests that factors such as an individual’s intrinsic motivation, professional standards, and preferences are important moderators of financial incentives.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

Call Number

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Publisher

United Kingdom : Oxford University Press., 2010

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

10531858

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 20 Suppl 2 July 2010.pp. i207-i223

Subject(s)

United Kingdom
Public Service Performance
Public service health care

Specific Detail Info

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