Journal Articles
Mobilizing the Mobilized: The Electoral Recruitment Paradox
The campaign mobilization literature argues that contacting will have the most influence on individuals who are socioeconomically or politically disadvantaged. Yet evidence persistently shows that the advantaged are disproportionately contacted. This paradox is explained once one recognizes that contacting during elections serves divergent goals that are tied to the election cycle and to election competitiveness. Broadly speaking, contacting in elections should be seen as having two participatory recruitment stages: a resource gathering stage—with resources coming from the advantaged—and a mass-mobilization stage—where every vote counts only when elections are competitive. This theory is supported with the 2000 Annenberg election data. In the resource gathering stage, income, education, and strong party identification increased the likelihood that an individual was contacted by the campaigns. In contrast, only income predicted mobilization stage campaign contact in nonbattleground states. Finally, a battleground state individual’s likelihood of being contacted slightly decreased as income rose.
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