Journal Articles

Counteractive Lobbying in the U.S. Supreme Court

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Theories of counteractive lobbying assert that interest groups lobby for the purpose of neutralizing the advocacy efforts of their opponents. We examine the applicability of counteractive lobbying to explain interest group amicus curiae participation in the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions on the merits. Testing the counteractive lobbying hypotheses from 1953 to 2001, we provide strong support for the contention that interest groups engage in counteractive lobbying in the nation's highest court. Our findings indicate that, like the elected branches of government, the Supreme Court is properly viewed as a battleground for public policy in which organized interests clash in their attempts to etch their policy preferences into law.

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Detail Information

Series Title

American Politics Research

Call Number

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Publisher

: sage publisher., 2009

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

1532673x

Classification

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Content Type

-

Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 37 no. 4 July 2009 pp. 670-699

Subject(s)

Interest group
Counteractive lobbying
U.S Supreme court
Counteractive Lobbying in the U.S. Supreme Court

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