Journal Articles

The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance

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Why do authoritarian dominant parties, once established, continue to win elections or lose power? Employing a time-series cross-national analysis of election outcomes and two country case studies, the author shows that dominant parties endure despite poor economic performance, voter demand for new parties, and sufficiently permissive electoral institutions. Instead, the author demonstrates that dominant parties continue to win when they can politicize public resources, and they fail when privatizations put the state’s fiscal power out of their reach.The argument has implications for the fate of dominant parties, transitions to democracy in competitive authoritarian regimes, and the study of incumbency advantages and electoral fairness in comparative politics.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Comparative Political Studies

Call Number

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Publisher

: sage publisher., 2010

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

00104140

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 43 no. 7, July 2010. pp. 807-834

Subject(s)

privatization
Party competition
Patronage
Clientelism
Single-party dominance
The Political Economy of Authoritarian

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