Journal Articles

The Properties of Simple Vs. Absolute Majority Rule: Cases Where Absences and Abstentions Are Important

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Little attention has been paid to the differences between absolute majority rule and simple majority rule, which differ in their treatment of absences and ‘votes to abstain’. This article fills that gap by undertaking a probabilistic analysis of the two voting rules assuming two alternatives and a quorum requirement for simple majority rule. The rules are compared in both a modified sincere setting and a strategic setting using five criteria: (1) the Pareto criterion, (2) the BT criterion (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962), (3) the Expected Social Gain criterion, (4) the Responsiveness criterion, and (5) a modified version of Rae’s criterion. In the sincere setting, we find that simple majority rule (with and without a quorum) outperforms absolute majority rule under most conditions for four out of the five criteria. In the strategic setting, we find that the voting rules perform much more similarly.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Call Number

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Publisher

Thousand Oaks, CA : Sage Publication., 2010

Collation

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Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

09516298

Classification

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Content Type

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Media Type

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Carrier Type

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Edition

Vol. 22, No. 1, January 2010. pp. 85-122

Subject(s)

Voter Turnout
Absolute majority rule
Simple majority rule
Social choice
The Properties of Simple Vs. Absolute Majority

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